Things That Don't Make Sense About The Hiroshima And Nagasaki Bombings

If there's a topic that needs little introduction, it's probably the atomic bomb. Just because the bombings of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are well known doesn't necessarily mean that everything about them makes complete sense, however.

The basic facts all have good standing. Throughout World War II, a group of American scientists and engineers worked together on the top-secret Manhattan Project, studying nuclear fission. By the middle of July 1945, a successful test of a plutonium bomb meant that the weapon was ready for deployment — too late for use in the European front of World War II, with Nazi Germany having already surrendered, but just in time for the Pacific front, where Japanese forces continued to fight. Military officers called for President Harry Truman to make use of the bomb, favoring a show of military might over a costly invasion of Japan, and Truman ultimately agreed. A number of target cities were selected and Hiroshima and Nagasaki were ultimately settled on, with the former being attacked on August 6 and the latter facing the same fate just three days later. Between the initial blasts and the long-term results of radiation exposure, tens of thousands of Japanese people — many of them civilians — died, with estimates ranging as high as some 200,000 deaths.

That's the story as it's popularly known, but when you start digging into the details, then the narrative gets considerably stranger; here are a few of those strange details.

The typical narrative is that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended World War II. On the surface, that seems consistent; Hiroshima was attacked on August 6, Nagasaki on August 9, and Japan surrendered on August 15. But on August 8, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, and that act might be what truly pushed Japan to unconditional surrender.

For context, the Soviet Union and Japan had entered into a neutrality pact in 1941 — beneficial to both countries in that it allowed both of them to focus on fewer fronts during World War II. Once the U.S. began gaining momentum in the Pacific, Emperor Hirohito personally reached out to Joseph Stalin, asking him to act as an intermediary between Japan and the U.S. But as the war with Germany turned in favor of the Allies, Stalin warmed to the idea of joining in the war against Japan, even though the neutrality pact was technically still in effect. As such, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was nothing less than a betrayal.

In just under a week, the Soviet army was moving on three different fronts against Japan, even finding success in areas of significant resistance. In discussions with his cabinet, Hirohito explicitly mentioned the Soviet Union in relation to surrender, "The military situation has changed suddenly. The Soviet Union entered the war against us ... Therefore, there is no alternative but to accept the Potsdam terms" (via The National Archives).

President Harry Truman is quoted as saying, "It was a terrible decision. But ... I made it to save 250,000 boys from the United States" (via USA Today). In general, government officials believed the bombs were a necessity, a way to avoid a far more costly invasion. As such, traditional narratives credit the atomic bomb with ending World War II, but some historians have since claimed that the bombs didn't need to be used. New analyses have claimed that Japan was ready to surrender before the bombing of Hiroshima.

There are two main pieces of evidence for this school of thought. One was a personal piece of correspondence penned by Emperor Hirohito and sent to Joseph Stalin, asking that the Soviet premier act as an intermediary in negotiations between Japan and the U.S. But Stalin received this letter before leaving for the Potsdam Conference (the meeting between Allied leaders regarding the end of World War II), which took place from July 17 to August 2. Hiroshima wasn't attacked until August 6 — an apparent argument that Japan was already prepared to discuss surrender. The other piece of evidence is a study called the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, which found that Japan would have likely surrendered before the Allies could invade, before many of the casualties that U.S. officials feared.

It should be noted, though, that historians heavily debate these points, undecided as to whether or not Japan would have surrendered before the U.S. dropped the atomic bomb.

What exactly ended the Pacific front of World War II is more a question of debate than most people would most likely expect. While the well-known narrative is that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki pushed Japan to surrender, the reality might be a lot more convoluted than that. In a twisted way, the atomic bomb might have been exactly what the Japanese government wanted.

Some historians have looked at Japanese internal records and determined that government leaders were genuinely afraid for the stability of their nation. The war — and all the difficulties that came with it, whether rationing or casualty counts — had left the Japanese people with bitterness toward their leadership. There was a very real chance that the unrest would push extremist groups to revolt, and none of that was helped by the fact that the concept of surrender went against the widely held beliefs that the government had spent much of the war perpetuating. Surrender wasn't an option; at least, it wasn't one that wouldn't come without major political consequences.

So it's possible that the atomic bomb might have provided a morbid — but convenient — out. Surrender in the face of potential nuclear destruction would be seen as more than justifiable, and it wouldn't tarnish the reputation of the Japanese government in the eyes of their people. All of that said, however, it's nearly impossible to know whether that was true, and historians can only speculate.

Given that the two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan, you'd think that the country the U.S. intended to intimidate was pretty obvious: Japan. But the real truth behind that narrative is rather murky.

With the Soviet Union on the rise, the end of World War II might be better analyzed as the start of the Cold War, as American leaders began exerting pressure on the Soviets. Though nuclear research had previously been kept secret from the USSR, Harry Truman changed that policy to reflect the new circumstances: The Soviets were poised to affect the balance of power in East Asia. The U.S. preferred that the USSR be given as little power as possible in that situation, so Truman let it slip that American scientists had developed a uniquely deadly weapon — a fact that historians now know had Joseph Stalin fairly concerned.

That situation — along with indications that Japan would have surrendered without the atomic bomb — has prompted a reevaluation of the reasons why the bombing was ordered, and some historians argue that the intimidation of the Soviet Union was a significant factor. Dropping the bombs might have been more of a show of power than of military strategy, thus giving the U.S. a stronger bargaining chip when it came to postwar negotiations. All that said, it's impossible for historians to be certain, with nuclear policy at the time being incredibly secretive and largely undocumented, so the truth might be lost to time.

Prior to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the U.S. did technically take precautions to warn the civilian populations of their target cities, air dropping pamphlets that urged the Japanese people to pressure their government into surrender, making mention of an incredibly powerful weapon that they would face if the war continued. On the surface, that would seem like enough to say that the U.S. attempted, at least, to limit civilian casualties — a humanitarian act. But later studies have led to some debate as to whether they were helpful.

The pamphlets themselves contained intimidating images of American military might, as well as lists of cities that might be targeted for attacks. A reported 33 cities received at least one of the three versions of the pamphlet, each of which had a slightly different list of target cities. However, the part that's particularly confusing and casts the biggest question over the humanitarian nature of the pamphlets is the fact that neither Hiroshima nor Nagasaki were among the named cities. Their citizens were entirely unaware that an attack was imminent, with reports from Hiroshima even explaining that the locals just thought it a beautiful, normal day. Even if you look outside of those two cities, others were firebombed or otherwise attacked weeks later, having never been named.

Arguably, the pamphlets only made the situation worse, with experts explaining that the threat of lethal force only led to increased chaos, which was the perfect breeding ground for more casualties, not less.

With hindsight, it's easy to see that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been even worse than people originally thought; it's impossible to deny the reasons many have cited when calling for the end of nuclear weapons entirely. The fact that the bombs would prompt feelings of shock and terror is something of a given in the modern day. But that wasn't the case during the war, difficult as that is to imagine.

Scientists close to the project actually made a prediction about the atomic bomb's effect in a 1946 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (via Carnegie Endowment) — a prediction that would prove to be rather incorrect. In their own words: "It is doubtful whether the first available bombs, of comparatively low efficiency and small size, will be sufficient to break the will or ability of Japan to resist." They believed that, in this situation, the atomic bomb wouldn't cause much more psychological damage than the normal bombing already taking place at that point.

In keeping with that assessment, the U.S. military was actually ready to keep making and dropping even more bombs — indefinitely, in fact. Shortly after the bombing of Nagasaki, military officials continued to make active plans for further attacks, including an outline that would include seven more bombs deployed by the end of October of that year. They were even planning the infrastructure needed to produce bombs consistently, at the rate of at least three per month.

With nuclear warfare suddenly becoming such a prominent — and lasting — threat since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it's hard to imagine a cavalier treatment of said threat. As irresponsible as that stance may seem, it was far from unrealistic, though. In the 1946 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (via Carnegie Endowment), despite simultaneously arguing that the atomic bomb wouldn't be particularly effective in pushing Japan to surrender, scientists also recognized that the deployment of nuclear weaponry during wartime would have serious repercussions when it came to the possibility of postwar peace. 

Dropping the bomb would shatter any trust the world had in the United State's desires for truly lasting peace, which the scientists bluntly stated, saying, "This kind of introduction of atomic weapons to the world may easily destroy all our chances of success." They had effectively predicted all of the fears that would come with the Cold War.

As such, those scientists advocated for transparency and to display the bomb in a test setting to diplomats from all over the world. By demonstrating power, rather than deploying it in secret, they argued that it may prove the U.S. was willing to work with other nations to prevent — rather than promote — nuclear warfare. A seemingly positive outcome, especially with the power of hindsight and knowing the arms race of the Cold War. But policymakers ultimately refused to consider anything aside from military usage of the bomb, overlooking the possibility of future peace.

If there's one thing about the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that almost everyone can agree on, it's that the radiation released by the bombs left thousands of people sick, killing many of them years after World War II ended. But some studies have claimed that low levels of radiation might actually prove beneficial, and they've used survivors from the outskirts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to argue their point.

The studies followed over 100,000 survivors, tracking their medical history over the decades, starting from 1950. More specifically, some of those survivors experienced relatively low levels of radiation — so low that they didn't actually experience radiation sickness. But the strange part of that was the conclusion drawn at the end of it all: Those who experienced such low levels of radiation didn't just avoid the negative effects of radiation. They also had comparatively low levels of mortality compared to people who weren't exposed to radiation at all.

As confusing as that sounds, the finding is technically supported by science, though even then, the entire situation is complicated. Pre-existing theories, particularly the hormetic theory of radiation, already existed that argued a similar point, saying that specific types of radiation, when experienced in low doses, can have health benefits. But larger organizations like the National Academy of Sciences and the United Nations don't recognize that theory at all, making this entire finding a little confusing to fully understand.

In the present day, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are almost always mentioned in the same breath, with both cities once destroyed by atomic bombs. But at the time, those two cities were not nearly as linked as they are today. A series of bizarre events and remarkably bad luck led to that.

In their initial plans, officials were explicitly looking for large cities (both in terms of size and population) and of particular military value. They managed to put together a short list of four cities that met all their criteria: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Kyoto. In other words, Nagasaki wasn't a primary target for the atomic bomb and was not mentioned on the list at all. It seemed like the city would be saved from destruction. But in June, Secretary of War Henry Stimson suddenly changed the list for reasons still debated today. According to him, Kyoto was too important a cultural center to be destroyed, but some historians have argued that he wanted to spare the city for personal reasons, as he might have spent his honeymoon there. Nagasaki was bumped onto the list of four candidates, literally handwritten into the new draft, but still in the last spot.

Things only got worse from there. Cloudy weather in the days leading up to the planned second bombing forced plans to change, and at the very last minute, the planes couldn't get a clear visual over Kokura, pushing the pilots to make the switch to Nagasaki on the spot.